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Abstract 
The paper argues against systematic overdetermination being an acceptable solution to the 
problem of mental causation within a Humean counterfactual theory of causation. The truth-
makers of the counterfactuals in question include laws of nature, and there are laws that support 
physical to physical counterfactuals, but no laws in the same sense that support mental to 
physical counterfactuals. 
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1. The overdetermination option 
The problem of the causal efficacy of mental properties – or the properties in which the 
special sciences trade in general – consists in the fact that the conjunction of the following 
four principles is inconsistent: 
1) Distinction: Mental events are not identical with physical events. 
2) Causation: Mental events cause physical events. 
3) Completeness: Any physical event has sufficient physical causes, insofar as it has causes at 
all. 
4) No systematic overdetermination: Events are not systematically overdetermined by mental 
and physical causes. 
Let an event be the instantiation of a property by an object, such that a mental event is the 
occurrence of a mental property, and a physical event the occurrence of a physical property. 
Of course, a more precise formulation of these principles is needed in order to prove the 
inconsistency of their conjunction. However, since no one disputes the fact of there being 
such an inconsistency, let this rough and ready formulation do for present purposes. 
Since Kim (1998) has drawn new attention to the problem of mental causation, the 
discussion has mainly focused on (1). In recent years, however, a number of authors have 
claimed that it is reasonable to abandon (4), provided that one endorses a Humean theory of 
causation (see notably Bennett 2003 and Loewer 2007b as well as Marras 2007, pp. 318-319; 
Kroedel 2008; Harbecke 2008, chapter 4). In that way, the metaphysics of causation becomes 
pertinent to the problem of mental causation. It is common to draw a distinction between 
dependence theories and production theories of causation (Hall 2004). Humean theories of 
causation, be they simple regularity theories, be they sophisticated regularity theories in terms 
of counterfactual dependence, are the most prominent example of the former. 
The claim thus is that by settling for a dependence theory of causation in contrast to a 
production theory, one makes a solution to the problem of mental causation available that 
consists in rejecting (4) by admitting systematic overdetermination: whenever a mental event 
– or any event that consists in the instantiation of a property in the domain of a special science 
– causes a physical event, the effect is overdetermined by both a sufficient mental and a 
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sufficient physical cause. In the discussion with Loewer (2007b), Kim (2007) commits 
himself to a version of the production theory of causation, and moreover formulates his view 
in such a way that it may cohere with classical mechanics, but obviously can work neither for 
general relativity theory nor for quantum theory, thus provoking the additional objection that 
the whole problem rests on an outdated conception of physics (Ladyman 2008). 
The claim of this short paper is that this turn of the discussion is misguided: whatever the 
current or future best physical theory may tell us about the world and whatever stance one 
takes in the metaphysics of causation, one faces the problem of mental causation. In 
particular, there is no easy way out of this problem for Humeans by simply abandoning (4). 
2. The relevance of laws 
Consider a situation in which a mental event m1 causes a physical event p2 by (2), with p2 
having also a sufficient physical cause p1 by (3), while m1 is not identical with p1 (by (1)), so 
that there is a case of overdetermination, contradicting (4) if such a scenario holds for mental 
causation in general. Assume furthermore that mental properties strongly supervene on 
physical properties: 
  
  m1  
 strongly   causes 
 supervenes on     
 
  p1 p2 
   causes 
 
One would have to set out a precise definition of strong supervenience, but we can again skip 
such complications for present purposes: the only function that strong supervenience has in 
this context is to ensure that there is no possible world in which there is an event of the same 
type as p1 without there also being an event of the same type as m1. Consequently, in the 
context of a counterfactual theory of causation, if p1 causes p2, the proposition “If p1 had not 
occurred, p2 would not have occurred either” is a true counterfactual. Then, by strong 
supervenience, the proposition “If m1 had not occurred, p2 would not have occurred either” is 
a true counterfactual as well. However, the mere fact of there being a true counterfactual that 
links the absence of p1 with the absence of p2 and there being a true counterfactual that links 
the absence of m1 with the absence of p2, while strong supervenience ensures that an event of 
the same type as p1 always goes together with an event of the same type as m1, is not 
sufficient to establish that there is a causal relation between m1 and p2, not even on Humean 
standards. 
According to Humean metaphysics, causal relations supervene on the distribution of the 
fundamental physical properties throughout the whole of space-time, these being perfectly 
natural and categorical properties (see Lewis’ thesis of Humean supervenience in e.g. Lewis 
1986a, introduction). Nonetheless, the truthvalue of counterfactual propositions about the 
actual world is fixed through similarity relations between the actual world and other possible 
worlds (see notably Lewis 1973 and 2004), without that manner of fixing their truthvalue 
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necessarily committing the Humean to realism about other possible worlds (see Loewer 
2007a). Again, the details of how the truthvalue of counterfactual propositions about the 
actual world is fixed through similarity relations with other possible worlds are not pertinent 
for present purposes, apart from the fact that laws of nature have a central position in fixing 
these truthvalues (and the laws that obtain in a given world again supervene on the 
distribution of the fundamental physical properties in the world in question). 
For present purposes, the only point that we need is that the situation is not equivalent as 
regards the laws that support the mentioned two counterfactuals: the counterfactual “If p1 had 
not occurred, p2 would not have occurred either” can with reason be taken to express a causal 
relation between p1 and p2, because it is supported by strict laws – at least if one takes p1 and 
p2 to be placeholders for appropriate configurations of fundamental physical tokens, p1 
standing for the fundamental physical supervenience base of m1. The laws in which types of 
physical properties figure are strict laws, or at least comparatively strict laws. Realism about 
entities and causal powers of entities combined with anti-realism about laws in fundamental 
physics (e.g. Cartwright 1983) is obviously not an option in the context of Humeanism and 
can in any case not help to make the assumption of systematic overdetermination plausible, 
since its commitment to a production view of causation simply rules systematic 
overdetermination out. The laws of the special sciences, by contrast, are never strict – or, in 
any case, less strict than fundamental physical laws, if one wants to leave the question of 
there really being strict laws open. If there are laws in the special sciences at all, these are 
ceteris paribus laws that admit a lot of exceptions, which cannot be specified in the 
vocabulary of the special science in question. This observation applies in particular to 
psychophysical laws. This was the reason why Davidson’s anomalous monism (Davidson 
1970) could not show that events cause anything insofar as they instantiate a mental property 
(see the papers in Heil and Mele 1993). A similar objection applies in the present context. 
Strong supervenience ensures that both the counterfactual “If p1 had not occurred, p2 would 
not have occurred either” and the counterfactual “If m1 had not occurred, p2 would not have 
occurred either” are true. However, the mere fact of these two counterfactuals being true does 
not ensure that they express a causal relation between the events in question each. The first 
one does so in virtue of its being supported by laws on a Humean regularity theory of 
causation, more precisely a sophisticated regularity theory that draws on laws insofar as they 
are central to making certain counterfactuals true. By contrast, in the case of the second 
counterfactual, there are no laws available that support the link between m1 and p2, at least not 
in the same way as there are laws that support the link between p1 and p2. As things stand, 
given the truth-makers for the first counterfactual, the second one is true only in virtue of m1 
strongly supervening on p1. 
However, such an asymmetry just is the motivation for refusing to abandon (4). Supposing 
systematic overdetermination, what distinguishes a situation in which m1 and p1 both cause p2 
from a situation in which only p1 causes p2, with m1 being epiphenemonal, while supervening 
on p1? For a Humean, it cannot be a primitive fact whether or not there is a causal relation 
between two events. A Humean regularity theory, and be it a sophisticated one in terms of 
counterfactual dependence, crucially draws on regularities that have the status of laws. But as 
regards laws, the situation is asymmetrical: there are no laws that support a mental to physical 
counterfactual in the same way as there are laws that support a physical to physical 
counterfactual. It is precisely this fact that drives the concern of epiphenomenalism, put in the 
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Humean context. The Humeans cannot help themselves to the fact of m1 strongly supervening 
on p1, for that fact alone does not counter the epiphenomenalism objection: the mere fact of a 
property strongly supervening on another property cannot constitute a sufficient reason for 
claiming that the supervenient property also causes – some – of the effects that the subvenient 
property causes so that these effects are overdetermined. Such a claim would amount to 
simply stipulating that properties which strongly supervene on other properties cannot be 
epiphenomenal. It would thereby throw the discussion back into the state in which it was 
before Kim published his 1998 book, repudiating earlier work in which he took mere 
supervenience to be sufficient to ensure the causal efficacy of mental properties. 
One may counter the preceding considerations by changing the position in such a way that 
one proposes to privilege the mental to physical counterfactual. The reasoning is, in brief, the 
following: the mental to physical counterfactual “If m1 had not occurred, p2 would not have 
occurred either” is privileged in certain situations on the grounds that m1 is an occurrence of a 
determinable property and p2 an occurrence of a more determinate property and that in certain 
situations it is the determinable by contrast to the determinate property occurrence that is 
causally relevant (see notably Yablo 1992 and Shoemaker 2007, chapter 2). Note, however, 
that the issue is about causation, not causal explanation. Consequently, if one holds such a 
view, one is (a) committed to regarding the distinction between determinables and 
determinates as an ontological rather than a conceptual one (see the objection by Gillet and 
Rives 2005). Furthermore, (b) one has to endorse token multiple realization, maintaining that 
the token m1 could have been realized by a token of another type than the type of p1 in another 
possible world. Token multiple realization can be taken to be outright absurd (Polger and 
Shapiro 2009). At least, it commits one to haecceitism: in this case, there are two property 
tokens m1 and m2 of the same mental property type; in the world w1, m1 is realized by a 
physical configuration of type P1, and m2 is realized by a physical configuration of type P2. In 
the world w2, by contrast, it is m1 that is realized by a physical configuration of type P2, and it 
is m2 that is realized by a physical configuration of type P1. The only difference between w1 
and w2 is a swap of m1 and m2. Worlds hence have to be recognized as different whose only 
difference consists in a swap of individuals, without there being any qualitative difference 
between them. Haecceitism is therefore widely considered to be an implausible position (see 
notably Lewis 1986b, chapter 4.4). Last but not least, (c) by privileging the mental to physical 
counterfactual, one no longer pursues a solution to the problem of mental causation that 
consists in abandoning the principle of no systematic overdetermination (4), but one rejects in 
fact the principle of completeness (3), endorsing physical effects that have mental in 
distinction to physical causes, insofar as this position remains committed to the principle of 
distinction (1) (see McLaughlin 2007 as regards that consequence). 
We thus get back to the traditional options to solve the problem of mental causation by 
dropping either (3) and endorsing some sort of dualist interactionism or by dropping (1) and 
endorsing some version of the psychophysical identity theory. Given the firm scientific 
grounds for (3) (see e.g. Papineau 2002, appendix), the conclusion of Kim (1998) stands, 
which always was also the position of Lewis himself from his 1966 paper on, despite the 
recent discussion about systematic overdetermination: if one endorses realism about mental 
causation, one has to attack (1) and come to terms with a version of the identity theory, 
whatever the best physical theories of the real world are, and whatever is one’s preferred 
stance in the metaphysics of causation. 
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